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Abstract: The Gateway Belief Model describes a process of attitudinal change where a shift 
in people’s perception of the scientific consensus on an issue leads to subsequent changes in 
their attitudes which in turn predict changes in support for public action. In the current study, 
we present the first large-scale confirmatory replication of the GBM. Specifically, we 
conducted a consensus message experiment on a national quota sample of the US population 
(N = 6,301). Results support the mediational hypotheses of the GBM: an experimentally 
induced change in perceived scientific consensus caes subsequent changes in cognitive 
(belief) and affective (worry) judgments about climate change, which in turn are associated 
with changes in support for public action. The scientific consensus message also had a direct 
effect on support for public action. We further found an interaction with both political 
ideology and prior attitudes such that conservatives and climate change disbelievers were 
more likely to update their beliefs toward the consensus. We discuss the model’s theoretical 
and practical implications, including potential explanations for why conveying scientific 
consensus can help reduce politically motivated reasoning. 
 
 




































Although a consensus has emerged in the scientific community on a range of scientific 
"facts”, including human evolution, the safety of childhood vaccines, and human-caused 
climate change, the public remains sharply divided on many of these topics (Pew, 2015a). 
This large discrepancy between the state of agreement in the scientific community and the 
general public has been referred to as the “consensu  gap” (Cook et al., 2018) 
 Among all of these important societal issues, human-caused climate change is 
arguably the most urgent, particularly because large-scale societal solutions will require 
significant changes in individual and collective human behavior and decision-making 
(Gifford, 2011; van der Linden, Maibach, & Leiserowitz, 2015). Yet, many climate change 
mitigation solutions are constrained when publics remain divided on basic scientific facts, 
such as whether or not humans are causing global warming. For example, despite the fact that 
about 97% of climate scientists have concluded that human-caused climate change is 
happening (Cook et al., 2016), only about half of Americans believe that climate change is 
mostly caused by human activity (Leiserowitz et al., 2017).      
 The Gateway Belief Model (GBM) introduced by van der Linden, Leiserowitz, 
Feinberg, & Maibach (2015) views the public’s (mis)perception of the degree of scientific 
consensus as an influential “gateway” cognition. A growing line of research has emerged 
evaluating the model’s theoretical mechanisms and the National Academy of Sciences (2017) 
has called for more research on the topic (p. 62). To further advance the literature, we 
conducted the largest confirmatory replication and extension of the Gateway Belief Model 
(GBM) to date using a nationally balanced quota sample of the US population (N = 6,301). 
Before proceeding to the method and analysis, we outline and expand on the history of the 
model’s development below, followed by an assessment of the empirical evidence to date, 
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2. The Gateway Belief Model 
 
“Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled, their views about 
global warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of 
scientific certainty a primary issue in the debate” – Frank Luntz (2002), political strategist  
 
The GBM captures what political strategists have intuitively understood for decades: the 
degree to which people perceive science as certain is  important heuristic that informs their 
personal views. At its core, the Gateway Belief Model (GBM) is a descriptive model in the 
sense that it describes a process of judgment and attitude change (van der Linden et al., 
2015). In particular, the model outlines a two-stage sequential mediational process (Figure 1). 
The first stage involves a “de-biasing” process where highlighting the degree of normative 
agreement (“scientific consensus”) on an issue, such as climate change, influences the 
public’s perception of that consensus. This change i  perceived scientific consensus then 
predicts cascading changes in other key beliefs about the issue, such as the belief that climate 
change is happening, human-caused, and a worrisome risk that requires societal action.  
 Notably, a change in perceived scientific consensus acts as a “gateway” in the sense 
that it predicts smaller subsequent changes in personal (private) beliefs and attitudes about 
climate change (van der Linden et al., 2015). In tur , changes in these central beliefs predict 
support for public action. In short, the influence of perceived scientific consensus on support 
for public action emerges indirectly, as the causal effect is mostly mediated by changes in key 
personal beliefs. This is largely a theoretically motivated hypothesis because highlighting 
scientific consensus is a non-persuasive communication: it only conveys the consensus that 
most climate scientists have concluded that are humans are causing global warming but does 
not directly speak to solutions or policy-support. Accordingly, information about scientific 
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relate to the consensus, with relatively weaker second-order effects on constructs that diverge 
further from the communication (e.g., worry, support f  action). Nonetheless, the predictions 
that flow from the GBM suggest that consensus in one domain (climate science) can serve as 
a “gateway” (foot-in-the-door) to achieving consensus in other domains (public opinion). 
 
 
Figure 1. Gateway Belief Model (GBM). 
 
The theoretical structure of the GBM was derived from important earlier correlational work, 
which independently found that perceptions of scientific agreement are strongly associated to 
science acceptance and support for climate policy (Ding et al., 2011; Lewandowsky, Gignac, 
& Vaughan, 2012; McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2013). The GBM combined and validated 
these relationships experimentally on a national US sample (van der Linden et al., 2015).  
 At its most generic level, the GBM offers a dual-processing account of judgment 
formation (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008; Marx et al., 2007) in the sense that the 
model combines both cognitive (belief-based) and affective (worry) determinants of public 
attitudes toward societal issues. To the extent that the left-hand side of the model represents 
input in the form of a consensus cue, the GBM is consistent with the literature on heuristic 
information processing (Chaiken, 1980). Because “consensus implies correctness”, people 













THE GATEWAY BELIEF MODEL 
6 
  
cognitively elaborate on a message (Darke et al., 1998; Mutz, 1998). For example, when the 
scientific consensus message is contested (motivating elaboration), its persuasiveness is 
reduced (Bolsen & Druckman, 2015; van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Rosenthal, & Maibach, 
2017). However, it should be noted that no explicit dis inction is made between conscious 
and non-conscious processing because heuristics can be deployed in both a reflective and 
intuitive manner (Todorov, Chaiken, & Henderson, 200 ; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). 
 In fact, reliance on heuristics can sometimes leadto (more) accurate judgments 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). For example, in the face of uncertainty, people often look 
to experts for guidance (Cialdini, Martin, & Goldstein, 2015) and for good reason: through 
the law of large numbers (Darke et al., 1998), the consensus-heuristic reduces the cost of 
individual learning. Research shows that people prefer to rely on the combined judgment of 
multiple experts (Mannes, Soll, & Larrick, 2014)—a process which improves judgment 
accuracy by selectively tapping the “wisdom of the crowd” (Budescu & Chen, 2014).  
 Moreover, although expert consensus is a scientific “fact”, it also has the distinct 
advantage of being social in nature, as group consensus is typically conveyed as a descriptive 
norm, i.e. it describes the average level of normative agreement [e.g. 97%] within a referent 
group (van der Linden et al., 2015) and as such, exerts informational influence (Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955; Cialdini et al., 1991). Given the central role that consensus decision-making 
has played in the evolution of human cooperation (Conradt & Roper, 2005), people are 
keenly attuned to cues about group consensus. Unfortu ately, people frequently misperceive 
social norms (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). For example, many individuals overestimate the 
pervasiveness of undesirable health behaviors, such as binge drinking (Prentice & Miller, 
1993). Although misperceiving the norm on unhealthy behaviors can be deleterious for the 
individual, collective misperceptions about the scientific evidence on existential risks such as 
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have a basic motivation to hold accurate perceptions about the world (Kunda, 1990), biased 
perceptions of the norm can be corrected, which in tur  often leads to subsequent changes in 
behavior because people want to align their behavior with the norm (Prentice & Miller, 1993; 
Spear & Haines, 1996; Schultz et al., 2007). Moreover, it is often easier to change people’s 
perception of the norm than it is to change private beliefs, which are more closely linked to 
deep-rooted ideologies (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). The GBM is premised on the same 
mechanism: closing the gap between the perceived and actual scientific norm on an issue. 
This can be done by shifting the central tendency (average) of the perceived norm to a new 
location (e.g. 97%) and by reducing its perceived variability (conveying high consensus). 
 
3.  The State of Empirical Evidence  
 
A growing number of empirical studies have either directly or indirectly investigated the core 
theoretical mechanisms of the GBM across different domains and cultures using a variety of 
measures. For example, many studies have found consiste t support for the basic finding that 
providing people with normative cues about the scientif c consensus on climate change can 
reliably shift people’s perception and understanding of that consensus (e.g. see Bolsen & 
Druckman, 2017; Brewer & McKnight, 2017; Cook et al., 2017; Cook & Lewandowsky, 
2016; Deryugina & Shurchkov, 2016; Harris et al., 2018; Kerr & Wilson, 2018; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Myers et al., 2015; van der Linden et al., 2015). Crucially, these 
findings are not limited to climate change, but also extend to the scientific consensus on 
vaccines (van der Linden, Clarke, & Maibach, 2015), GMOs (Dixon, 2016; Kerr & Wilson, 
2018), the Brexit vote (Harris et al., 2018), nuclear power (Kobayashi, 2018a), and non-
politically charged issues (Chinn, Lane, & Hart, 2018; Johnson, 2017).   
 With respect to the effects on people’s private atitudes, evidence in support of the 
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conformity with scientific authority and that the prception of expert consensus could 
therefore have important effects on an individual’s private attitudes. The author confirms this 
empirically by noting that when it comes to global warming and evolution, perception of a 
scientific consensus substantially increases the odds f personal acceptance (Tom, 2017; see 
also Dunwoody & Kohl, 2017). This finding is further bolstered by a recent meta-analysis in 
which Hornsey et al. (2016) identify perceived scientific consensus as one of the strongest 
correlates of belief in climate change, stronger than e.g. ideology or cultural worldviews. 
Conceptual replications of the gateway hypothesis have also offered evidence in support for 
the model. For example, in their national consensus me sage experiment on climate change, 
Bolsen and Druckman (2017) test and confirm the GBM’s key mediational hypotheses. 
Similarly, in the context of climate change and GMOs, Kerr and Wilson (2018) find that 
consensus messages significantly increased personal agreement and that this increase was in 
turn mediated by changes in perceptions of a scientific consensus, as predicted by the GBM. 
 Brewer and McKnight (2017) also evaluate the GBM’s mediational predictions in the 
context of global warming. The authors find that their result “reinforces the argument that 
consensus messaging can be an effective tool at fostering belief in global warming” (p. 177). 
Similarly, in a Japanese sample, Kobayashi (2018a) concludes; “overall, the present research 
gives empirical support for the idea—the assumption underlying the gateway belief model—
that perceived scientific consensus plays a unique role in scientific belief change” (p. 81).  
Yet, support for the GBM has not been unanimous. For example, Kahan (2015) 
questioned the practical importance of van der Linden et al.’s (2015) mediational hypotheses 
for the final outcome variable in the model: public support for action. Further, Deryugina and 
Shurchkov (2016) and Dixon, Hmielowski, and Ma (2017) both find that scientific consensus 
messages did not directly impact support for climate policy. However, it is important to note 
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are expected to be mediated by changes in perceived sci ntific consensus. Because studies do 
not always include both type of variables, they cannot reliably adjudicate on this matter. 
Moreover, detecting a significant indirect effect in the absence of a total effect is both 
common and theoretically justified in psychological research (Hayes, 2009; Rucker et al., 
2011; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Nonetheless, we recognize the applied value of direct effects 
and a significant main effect on each outcome variable would further strengthen the 
importance of any subsequent mediation.       
 A final issue in the GBM revolves around the role f political ideology. Because 
polarization on climate change has sharply increased ov r the last decades (Dunlap & 
McCright, 2016), the extent to which people use scintific consensus as a heuristic cue for 
informing their own judgments may depend on their ideology and trust in referent groups, 
such as scientists. Given the concern that climate change campaigns could disengage 
[conservative] audiences, it is of both theoretical and practical importance to establish 
whether a backfire effect occurs. For example, the cultural cognition thesis predicts that 
exposure to the scientific consensus would lead to belief polarization (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, 
& Braman, 2010). Yet, in their original studies, van der Linden et al. (2014, 2015) found 
evidence for an interaction between exposure to the scientific consensus and party affiliation 
such that Republicans (positively) adjusted their prception of the scientific consensus more 
than Democrats. This finding is consistent with work by Lewandowsky et al. (2013) and 
Cook et al. (2017) who both found that highlighting scientific consensus neutralized the 
effect of free-market ideology on belief in climate change. Similarly, Brewer and McKnight 
(2017) find greater consensus-effects among those with low environmental interest.  
 Other studies did not find a significant interaction, but concluded that the scientific 
consensus message elicited relatively uniform effects a ross the political spectrum (Bolsen & 
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the scientific consensus appeals equally well or more t  certain groups, what’s of particular 
note is that, with some exceptions (e.g. Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016), these studies jointly 
provide little to no support for a so-called “polarizing”, “backfire”, or “boomerang” effect. 
Indeed, Dixon et al. (2017) state; “It is notable that a backfiring effect among conservatives 
was not observed” (p. 7). Similarly, Brewer and McKnight (2017) conclude; “viewers did not 
engage in motivated reasoning in response to consensus messaging” (p. 177). 
 
4.  Present Study  
The main objective of the present study is to provide a confirmatory replication of the 
Gateway Belief Model (GBM) by van der Linden et al. (2015). We advance the literature in 
two important aspects. First, the experimental and control groups in the original study were 
unbalanced, which affects power and interaction effects. In addition, prior studies have only 
offered partial conceptual replications of the mediational hypotheses posited by the GBM, 
often using convenience samples. To our knowledge, no study has directly replicated the full 
GBM (as theorized) using the same variables on a high-powered national sample of U.S. 
adults (N = 6,301). Second, we extend the original research by evaluating the robustness of 
the interaction with Party ID across a range of additional and arguably more direct measures, 
including political ideology and prior attitudes toward climate change. Because our sample is 
much larger and balanced across experimental groups n olitical ideology, the current study 























5.1  Sample and Procedure 
 
We obtained a large national quota sample (N = 6,301) of the US population from 
Qualtrics LLC, who maintain a panel of over 60 million people in the United States 
(Qualtrics, Provo, UT). National quotas were included for gender, age, region, education, 
ethnicity, and political ideology. In addition to approximating U.S. census demographics 
overall, both the experimental (n = 3,150) and control (n = 3,151) groups were also each 
balanced on the same socio-demographic characteristics (please see Supplement for details). 
The experiment was conducted online with the Qualtrics survey software using a 
mixed factorial design, combining within (post-pre) as well as between (treatment vs. control) 
subject measures. This design is statistically powerful because it controls for both within and 
between subject sources of variation (Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 2012). Following van der 
Linden et al. (2015), respondents were first presented with three randomized blocks of bogus 
questions about popular media topics (of equal length) to hide the true purpose of the study 
and to reduce potential demand effects. One block featured questions on new state-level 
regulations around drunk driving, the other asked pople about the Apple watch, and the last 
block contained the key questions about global warming. Respondents were then (falsely) 
told that the researchers maintain a large database of m dia statements and that they would 
randomly be shown one of these statements (the descriptive norm was always the same, 
namely that; “97% of climate scientists have concluded that human-caused global warming is 
happening”) 1. Consistent with van der Linden et al. (2015), the control group completed a 
short neutral word sorting task. After exposure, participants were asked a few unrelated 
questions about the new Star Wars movie as an additional distraction. We asked the same 
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questions both at the start (pre-test) and at the end of the survey (post-test) in both groups. 




Perceived Scientific Consensus. Consistent with van der Linden et al. (2015) we 
measured perceived consensus on a slider scale, ranging from 0% to 100% (M = 67.32, SD = 
22.26). Participants were asked; “To the best of your knowledge, what percentage of climate 
scientists have concluded that human-caused global warming is happening?”   
 Belief in Global Warming2. “How strongly do you believe that global warming is or is 
not happening?” Response options were given on a continuum (M = 5.25, SD = 1.75), 
ranging from 1 (I strongly believe that global warming is not happening), 4 (I am unsure 
whether or not global warming is happening) to 7 (Istrongly believe global warming IS 
happening). For subgroup analysis, three prior attitude groups were created using equal thirds 
of the scale value (1/3rd * 7) so that the first group ranges from 0 to 2.33 and so on.3 
Human-Causation. “Assuming global warming IS happening: How much of it do you 
believe is caused by human activities, natural changes in the environment, or a combination 
of both?” Response options (M = 4.96, SD = 1.61) ranged from 1 (I believe that global 
warming is caused mostly by natural changes in the environment), 4 (caused equally by 
natural changes and human activities) to 7 (caused mostly by human activities). 
 Worry about Global Warming. On a scale from 1 to 7 (M = 4.70, SD = 1.82), 
"How worried are you about global warming?” Response options ranged from 1 (I am not at 
all worried about global warming), 4 (neutral) to 7 (I am very worried about global warming). 
                                                 
2 For the remaining measures, we made one change in contrast to van der Linden et al. (2015): instead of 0-100 
scales we adopted 7-point scales to facilitate more straightforward comparisons with other research. 
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Support for Action on Global Warming. On a scale from 1 to 7 (M = 5.46, SD = 1.55), 
“Do you think people should be doing more or less to reduce climate change?” Responses 
ranged from 1 (Much less), 4 (Same amount) to 7 (Much more).  
Political Party and Ideology. We assessed ideology on a 5-point scale (very 
conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, very liberal, M = 2.85, SD = 1.12) as well as 
political party affiliation (Republican, Democrat, Independent). For mediation analyses, 
political ideology was recoded so that higher scores reflect greater conservatism.  
 
 6.  Results 
We start with an overview of the main effects of the consensus treatment (vs. control) on 
changes (post-pre) in each of the dependent variables. Following a significant MANOVA on 
the five dependent variables, F(5, 6295) = 246.02, p < 0.001, Wilk's Λ = 0.84, univariate t-
tests (revised ɑ = 0.01) indicated a significant main effect of theconsensus treatment on all 
key dependent variables (p < 0.001). Results comparing change scores across conditions are 
listed in Table 1 and visualized in Figures 2-3. As expected, there is a large initial effect on 
perceived scientific consensus (d = 0.88), followed by significant effects on the belief that 
global warming is happening (d = 0.14), human-caused (= 0.23), how much people worry 
about the issue (d = 0.11) and whether they support more public action (d = 0.09).  
 The pattern of main effects is consistent with the general observation that effect-sizes 
decrease in size as a function of how distal the variable is to the (consensus) treatment. We 
further investigated the main effect of the treatment (Mdiff = 16.81,  SE = 0.40) on perceived 
scientific consensus by political ideology, party identification, and prior belief in global 
warming (visualized in Figure 3). As can be observed from the trends in Figure 3, a between-
subjects ANOVA on the post-pre difference score revealed a significant main effect and 
interaction pattern across all measures of ideology, party ID, and prior attitudes such that the 
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MSE = 337.46, p < 0.001, η2  = 0.16 (main effect), is stronger for conservatives F(2, 6,295) = 
11.63, MSE = 334.90, p < 0.001, η2  = 0.004 (interaction), Republicans F(2, 5,187) = 16.25, 
MSE = 328.72, p < 0.001, η2  = 0.006 (interaction), and those with lower prior belief in global 
warming F(2, 6,295) = 35.52, MSE = 329.64, p < 0.001, η2  = 0.01 (interaction). Notably, this 
interaction did not reliably occur for any of the other personal belief variables (all ps> 0.30). 
Separate plots of the pre and post test means for each group similarly reveal that the greatest 
gains (relative to baseline) occur for conservatives (please see Supplementary Figures 1-4).  
 
  Table 1. Main Effects of Consensus Message on Key Dependent Variables. 
 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. All mean comparisons significant at *** p < 0.001 (bold face). 
Cohen’s d is a standardized measure of effect size (Cohen, 1988). Bayes factors between 10 and 30 are 
considered “strong evidence” while values > 30 indicate very strong evidence (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018).  
Dependent variables  






(n = 3,150)                           
Control  
Group 
∆ Post-Pre  
(n = 3,151) 
Cohen’s d 
95% CI  
    BF10 
Perceived Scientific Consensus 
(0% - 100%) 









Belief GW is Happening 
(1-7) 









Belief GW is Human-Caused 
(1-7) 
 







Worry about Global warming 
(1-7) 
 
Support for Public Action 
(1-7) 
   0.28*** 
(0.25, 0.31) 
 


































Figure 2. Main effects (post-pre) by experimental condition f r belief that global warming is 




Figure 3. Main effect (post-pre) on perceived scientific consensus (0%-100%) in percentage 
points (panel A) by political ideology (panel B), prior attitudes toward GW (panel C), and 
Party ID (panel D). Sample sizes for political ideology; conservative (n = 2,258), moderate       
(n = 2,470) and liberal (n = 1,573), prior attitude; GW is not happening ( = 645), unsure           
(n = 1,395) and GW is happening (n = 4,261), political party ID; Republican (= 1,491), 
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Having established significant main effects on all mediating and outcome variables, we 
proceed with replicating the GBM path relationships in the Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
outlined by van der Linden et al. (2015) using the same variables and model specification. All 
mediation analyses were conducted in STATA 14.2’s SEM module (StataCorp, 2015) using 
maximum likelihood estimation. It is important to nte that although mediation models are 
frequently estimated on observational data (Stone-Romero et al., 2018), all variables in the 
model represent post-pre differences in beliefs conditional on experimental assignment, 
which allows for stronger conclusions about causal mediation (Bullock et al., 2010).  
 Main results are visually displayed in Figure 4 and indicate good model fit and 
confirm significant direct effects for all path relationships in the model. The breakdowns of 
all indirect, direct, and total effects are listed in Tables 2-3. In general, the pattern of results is 
consistent with the model reported by van der Linden et al. (2015): an experimentally 
induced change in perceived scientific consensus significantly predicts post-pre changes in 
the belief that climate change is happening, human-caused, and a worrisome threat. In turn, 
changes in these key cognitions and emotions predict greater support for public action.  
Figure 4. Gateway Belief Model (GBM). Note: Coefficients are standardized and 95% 

















For ease of interpretation, the direct paths between experimental assignment and all other 
variables in the model are non-significant (all ps > 0.11) and not visually depicted. In other 
words, the GBM is a two-stage sequential mediation m del: the effect of experimental 
condition on all cognitive and affective judgments is fully mediated by the large initial 
changes in PSC (stage 1). In turn, the effect of higher PSC on support for public action is 
mediated by smaller subsequent changes in key personal beliefs (stage 2)4. Although van der 
Linden et al. (2015) reported full mediation in their original study, it is noteworthy that in 
addition to a significant indirect effect (β = 0.04, 95%CI; 0.03, 0.05, Table 2), a significant 
direct effect of PSC on public support for action remains (dotted lines), even when 
controlling for all key personal beliefs in the model (β = 0.06, 95%CI; 0.03, 0.08, Table 3).   
 Lastly, we investigated the role of political ideology. Although van der Linden et al. 
(2015) reported an exploratory interaction between id ology and the consensus treatment (on 
PSC), they did not explore the possibility of cascading indirect effects. As shown in Figure 4, 
we reliably replicated this interaction, finding tha  after exposure to the scientific consensus 
message, conservatives show greater changes in perceived consensus than liberals. When 
both ideology and an interaction between ideology and condition are included in the model5, 
the direct effect of the interaction on perceived consensus is significant (β = 0.05, 95% CI; 
0.03, 0.07). Importantly, there are also smaller, but significant indirect effects flowing from 
the interaction to all key beliefs, including support f r public action (Table 4). The interaction 




                                                 
4 The coefficients are not influenced by the inclusion of covariates (gender, age, education, ideology).  

















Table 2. SEM model parameters (direct and total effects) 
 
Note: PSC = Perceived Scientific Consensus; GW = Global W rming; HC = Human Causation; standardized 



















Model path relationships  βdirect 95% C.I. βtotal 95% C.I. 
Condition  PSC 0.40 0.38, 0.42 0.40 0.38, 0.42 
   
  
PSC  Belief in GW 0.13 0.11, 0.15 0.13 0.11, 0.15 
   
  
PSC  Belief in HC 0.22 0.20, 0.25 0.22 0.20, 0.25 
   
  
PSC  Worry 0.10 0.07, 0.13 0.13 0.11, 0.16 
   
  
Belief in GW  Worry 0.07 0.05, 0.10 0.07 0.05, 0.10 
   
  
Belief in HC  Worry 0.10 0.07, 0.13 0.10 0.07, 0.13 
   
  
PSC  Public Action                   0.06      0.03, 0.08 0.10 0.07, 0.12 
 









   
  
Belief in HC  Public Action 0.04 0.02, 0.07 0.06 0.04, 0.09 
   
  
Worry  Public Action 0.20 0.18, 0.23 0.20 0.18, 0.23 
  











































Note: Condition = consensus message (vs. control), PSC = Perceived Scientific Consensus; GW = Global 
Warming; HC = Human Causation; standardized regression coefficients. N = 6,301. Indirect effects ran through 




Table 4. SEM model parameters (with ideology) 
 
Note: ID = political ideology (conservative), condition = consensus message, PSC = Perceived Scientific 
Consensus; GW = Global Warming; HC = Human Causation; standardized regression coefficients. N = 6,301. 
The indirect effects are for the ID*condition  PSC path (on all other variables in the model).  
 
Model path relationships  β 95% C.I. 
Condition  Belief in GW 0.05 0.04, 0.06 
   
Condition  Belief in HC 0.09 0.08, 0.19 
   
Condition  Worry 0.05 0.04, 0.06 
 
Condition  Public Action  
 
     0.04 
 
0.03, 0.05 
   
PSC  Public Action 0.04 0.03, 0.05 
   
Belief in GW  Public Action 0.01 0.01, 0.02 
   
Belief in HC  Public Action 0.02 0.01, 0.03 
    




   
  
ID*condition  PSC 0.05 0.03, 0.07                                             -
   
  
ID*condition  Belief in GW                  0.01   -0.01, 0.03 0.007  0.003, 0.010 
 









   
  
ID*condition  Worry -0.02 -0.05, 0.01 0.007 0.003, 0.001 
   
  
ID*condition   Public Action -0.01 -0.03, 0.01 0.005 0.002, 0.007 
  

















7.  Discussion 
The current research makes at least two interrelated contributions to the literature. First, in 
contrast to partial mediation tests, we conducted a direct confirmatory replication of the GBM 
by van der Linden et al. (2015) using a large, high-powered, and balanced national sample. 
This is important because separate partial mediation tests conducted on non-representative 
(observational) data can inflate Type 1 and 2 errors (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, & 
Maibach, 2018). This also allowed us to extend theoretical development of the Gateway 
Belief Model and address several key criticisms. Second, we extend prior research by 
investigating the consistency of interaction effects between perceived scientific consensus, 
Party ID, political ideology, and prior attitudes towards global warming.  
7.1 Replicating the Gateway Belief Model (GBM) 
In terms of model specification, all path relationships were significant and the model did not 
need any modifications to achieve good model fit. The low “lack of fit” (e.g. RMSEA) and 
high “goodness of fit” (e.g. CFI) indices were identical if not descriptively better than in the 
original study, providing further evidence for the robust nature of the theorized causal 
relationships as identified by key prior research on this topic (Ding et al., 2011; McCright et 
al., 2013; van der Linden et al., 2015). Another point f consistency between van der Linden 
et al. (2015) and the current model is that while both processes are influenced by perceived 
scientific consensus, affective judgments (worry) appear more influential than cognitive 
judgments (e.g. the belief that global warming is happening and human-caused) in driving 
public support for action. Importantly, this finding is consistent with a large literature on “risk 
as feelings” vs. “risk as analysis” (Slovic et al.,2004) and the role of emotion (worry) in 
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 Yet, one primary difference between the original study and the current replication is 
the significant direct effect of perceived scientific consensus on support for public action in 
the mediation model. The source of this difference is likely due to the fact that this consensus 
experiment had significantly stronger main effects on all key personal belief variables, 
including support for action (which was partially but not fully mediated by the inclusion of 
PSC). This finding strengthens the conceptual link between perceived scientific consensus 
and support for action. Moreover, because the effect-sizes decrease in size the further the 
construct is removed from the consensus statement, prior research may have had insufficient 
power to detect these substantially smaller direct effects (Rucker et al., 2011). Another 
interesting point of difference is that the current study used the term “global warming” 
whereas van der Linden et al. (2015) used “climate change”. On one hand, given the well-
established effects of labeling on public perception (Schuldt, 2016), we acknowledge that 
framing effects could influence the results. On the other hand, it is encouraging that wording 
differences did not seem to influence key findings. In fact, our model can be regarded as a 
conservative test given that the public is known to perceive greater scientific consensus when 
the term “climate change” is used vs. “global warming” (Schuldt, Roh, & Schwarz, 2015).  
7.2 Consensus neutralizes conflict: A non-identity threating cognition 
 
We advance two potential explanations for the interaction between ideology and exposure to 
the scientific consensus message. First, the rate of b lief change could be explained by a 
potential ceiling effect among liberals given their r latively higher baseline perceptions of the 
consensus (76% vs. 62%). However, this doesn’t explain the motivational incentive for 
conservatives to update their beliefs in light of strong political polarization. Accordingly, we 
theorize that expert consensus-perceptions (perceptions of what other, non-political groups 













THE GATEWAY BELIEF MODEL 
22 
  
perceptions of what scientists believe than it is to overhaul one’s ideological worldview, 
given the stability of ideology over the lifespan (Sears & Funk, 1999). Indeed, people’s 
willingness to update their beliefs about what other people believe, otherwise known as 
“meta” or “second-order” climate beliefs has been underestimated (Mildenberger & Tingley, 
2017; van Boven et al., 2018), presumably because sch beliefs are less threatening and can 
serve as a “gateway” to changing other beliefs. Moreover, in the long-term, changing norms 
is important in itself because changes in perceived norms represent shifts in people’s 
understanding of society and its overall direction (Tankard & Paluck, 2016).   
In addition, conservatives are unlikely to take cues from liberals on politically 
polarized issues and vice versa. In other words, the intergroup nature of the climate change 
conflict calls for neutral mediators (Pearson & Schuldt, 2018; Swim & Bloodhart, 2018). 
Scientists are one referent group that, on average, are trusted sources of information about 
global warming (Leiserowitz et al., 2013) and a majority of the US public regard scientists as 
ideologically-neutral (Pew, 2015b). Importantly, consistent with other research (Frimer, 
Gaucher, & Schaefer, 2014), this study finds that both groups are willing to conform to 
ideologically-neutral outgroups (experts). Although conservatives are known to value 
obedience to authority more than liberals (Jost et al., 2018), this relationship may be mediated 
by known partisan differences around trust in climate scientists (Kennedy & Funk, 2016). 
Accordingly, it is likely that conservatives would be even more receptive if the scientific 
consensus was presented by a prototypical in-group member (e.g. Benegal & Scruggs, 2018).
 Second, Krosnick and Macinnis (2015) argue that selective exposure to different 
media content could play a bigger role in accounting for the divergence in Americans views 
on global warming than motivated reasoning. In other words, perhaps conservatives are just 
less familiar with the scientific consensus. This is not implausible given that for decades, 
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cast doubt on the reality of human-caused global warming (Elsasser & Dunlap, 2013; Oreskes 
& Conway, 2010; Cook et al., 2018). This hypothesis is corroborated by evidence that the 
knowlede gap about the scientific consensus—althoug hi h in general—is substantially 
higher among conservatives (Leiserowitz et al., 2017). Importantly, experimental research 
finds that both false media balance and misinformation can easily neutralize and distort 
people’s perception of expert consensus (Bolsen & Druckman, 2018; Cook et al., 2017; 
Koehler, 2016; van der Linden et al., 2017). This is consequential because higher domain 
knowledge is known to reduce ideological biases (Guy et al, 2014). In short, the observed 
interaction is likely the result of both selective exposure and the fact that updating second-
order normative beliefs is psychologically less threatening. 
 
7.3 The consensus-heuristic: Accuracy vs. motivated reasoning 
 
At a more general level, our findings contribute to a growing literature which shows that 
people use consensus cues as a heuristic to help form judgments about whether or not the 
position advocated in a communication is valid (Darke et al., 1998; Cialdini et al., 1991; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Panagopoulos & Harrison, 2016; Mutz, 1998; Schultz et al., 
2007). The current results are especially interesting because the persuasive power of 
scientific consensus benefits from two heuristics in that “consensus implies correctness” and
“statements from experts can be trusted” (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Cialdini et al., 
2015). In other words, when it comes to social norms, there can be a clear divergence 
between “going along vs. getting it right” (Chenn et al., 1996). Yet, in the case of expert 
consensus both motivations are satisfied, as going along with the (expert) crowd also offers a 
higher likelihood of getting it right (Budescu & Chen, 2014; Cook et al., 2018; Mannes, Soll, 
& Larrick, 2014). Neurological research even finds that people experience reward-signals 
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 At the same time, defense-motivations can lead people t  selectively deploy heuristics 
in a way that is congenial to their prior attitudes (Chen et al., 1996; van der Linden et al., 
2017). In fact, a large literature in social and political psychology shows people selectively 
attend to evidence, assimilate information in a waythat reinforces prior beliefs, and are 
motivated to reject information that threatens their worldviews (Bolsen & Druckman, 2014; 
Hart & Nisbet, 2012;  Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Kahan, 
2015; Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998; Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017; Taber & Lodge, 2006).  
Importantly, however, in a large national sample, th  current study finds no support 
for the belief polarization claim (Kahan et al., 2010), as the opinions of conservatives, 
liberals, and those with skeptical and supportive prior attitudes all converged towards the 
scientific consensus. In fact, exposure to the scientific consensus interacted positively with 
political ideology (conservativsm), including indirect effects on personal attitudes and 
support for action. These findings are consistent with a growing literature on consensus 
messaging (Brewer & McKnight et al., 2017; Cook et al., 2017; Lewandowsky et al., 2013 
van der Linden et al., 2017), including more mixed cases where studies do not find evidence 
of a “boomerang”, “backfire” or “polarization” effect (Bolsen & Druckman, 2017; Dixon et 
al., 2017; Kobayashi, 2018b; Kerr & Wilson, 2018; Myers et al., 2012). This is not to say that 
there are no exceptions (e.g., see Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016) or that people do not engage 
in politically motivated reasoning. However, studies ncreasingly find that true belief 
polarization is a relatively rare phenomenon (Guess & Coppock, in press; Kuhn & Lao, 1996; 
Kobayashi, 2018b). Even Lee Ross (2012) commented on partisan motivated reasoning 
theories, suggesting that “we cannot assume that people persist in their views simply because 
of some emotional attachment to them” (p. 241). Indeed, motivated reasoning has a limit 
(Redlawsk et al., 2010) and the relative importance of accuracy versus directional goals is 
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corrections across 52 political issues found no evidence of belief polarization (Wood & 
Porter, 2018). The authors conclude: “by and large, citizens heed factual information, even 
when such information challenges their ideological commitments” (p. 1). As such, our 
findings have important implications for more nuanced and contextualized debates about the 
role of accuracy and defense motivation in reasoning about evidence. 
 
7.4 Practical implications and future research 
 
Dixon (2016) correctly notes that important questions remain about how to best apply the 
Gateway Belief Model (GBM). For example, even if perceived scientific consensus acts as a 
gateway cognition, one might wonder about the practic l importance of the cascading direct 
and indirect effects on personal attitudes and support for public action (Kahan, 2015; Kerr & 
Wilson, 2018). We outline three arguments in favor of the practical importance of the GBM. 
  Purely in terms of effect-sizes, the experimental m in effects on the second-order 
variables (i.e. personal beliefs and support for public action) can be considered small (Cohen, 
1988). Yet, it should be noted that, contextually, they are average and lie between the 50th 
and 75th percentile of all effects in media and persuasion research (Weber & Popova, 2012). 
Considering that the scientific consensus message does not specifically target worry or 
support for action, this could be considered impressive. The initial effect on perceived 
consensus (d = 0.88) is large and lies above the 95th percentile of effect-sizes in media and 
persuasion psychology research (Weber & Popova, 2012). Furthermore, small effects can be 
considered meaningful, especially when a) the experimental manipulation is minimal and b) 
the dependent variable is difficult to influence (Prentice & Miller, 1992). We maintain that 
both of these conditions are satisfied here as the exp rimental manipulation is extremely 
minimal and public opinion on climate change (let alone policy-support) is notoriously 
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effects matter when scaled at population level; “individual opinions influence political 
outcomes through aggregation. Even a modest amount of variation in opinion across 
individuals will profoundly influence collective deliberations” (p. 1406). To contextualize 
this, a d of 0.15 roughly translates to a change in public support from 50% to 54%—recent 
elections have hung on less (e.g. Brexit 51.9% vs. 48.1%).   
 One could counter-argue that although the scientifc consensus on global warming has 
been around for decades, little has happened (Kahan, 2015). Yet, this point a) ignores 
experimental evidence on the potent role of misinformation in neutralizing the effect of the 
scientific consensus (Aklin & Urpelainen, 2014; Cook et al., 2017; van der Linden et al., 
2017) and b) is contradicted by evidence that public perceptions of the scientific consensus 
and corresponding beliefs that climate change is human-caused have been increasing since 
2010 while polarization on these beliefs has decreased (Cook et al., 2018; Hamilton, 2016). 
 A final critique concerns the fact that the GBM is not sensitive to individual 
differences. Yet, the extent to which it is useful to consider individual differences in the 
GBM remains unclear. For example, the interaction between ideology and the scientific 
consensus may not generalize across all issues (c.f., Dixon, 2016; van der Linden, Clarke, & 
Maibach, 2015). Similarly, it could be argued that the effects may be conditional on trust in 
climate scientists given the important role of trus (Harris et al., 2018), yet research to date 
has not found that inclusion of trust, perceived credibility of scientists, or deference to 
scientific authority produces meaningful moderation effects in the GBM (Chinn et al., 2018; 
Dixon, 2016; Kobayashi, 2018a). Furthermore, as a general rule, it should be illustrated that 
making the model substantially more complex by adding individual difference moderators is 
worth the trade-off by corresponding increases in model fit, explanatory, or predictive power.  
Lastly, although the measures adopted here have been used in prior research, we 
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we note that our conceptualization of support for public action is broad-stroke and future 
work on the GBM would benefit from measuring personal engagement and support for more 
specific climate change mitigation policies (e.g. see Ding et al., 2011). We encourage future 
research to improve the ecological validity of consensus message experiments, for example, 
by contextualizing the scientific consensus within politicized debates (Bolsen & Druckman, 
2015; Cook et al., 2017; van der Linden et al., 2017), by modelling the decay of the 
consensus effect over time, and by examining geographic l variation in scientific belief 
change (Zhang et al., 2018). Lastly, our mediation model is guided by prior and replicated 
theoretical relationships that provide a good fit to he data and we demonstrate causal effects 
of the consensus treatment on all key mediators and outcome variables. However, we still 
cannot fully ascertain a temporal chain where cascading changes in key beliefs (M) cause 
higher support for public action (Y) as separate experiments would need to be conducted to 
independently manipulate the MY paths (Stone-Romero et al., 2008). Accordingly, we 
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1. Supplementary Tables 
 

























Note: Proportion of respondents in each category in the treatment and control groups and overall sample, 
respectively. Balance tests indicate no statistically significant differences between the two groups (s > .5).  
 
Demographics Control (p)         Treatment  (p)         Total (p) 
Gender   
   
Male    0.45                       0.46   0.46 
Female    0.55                       0.54   0.54 
   
Age   
   
18-24    0.14                       0.14   0.14 
25-34    0.22                       0.23   0.22 
35-44    0.16                       0.16   0.16 
45-64    0.34                       0.35    0.34 




   
Less than high school     0.05                     0.05    0.05   
High school graduate     0.32                       0.33    0.33 
Some college  
Bachelor’s degree 









   0.33                       0.32 
   0.18                       0.18 




   0.08                       0.09 
   0.73                       0.72 
   0.12                       0.12   
   0.07                       0.07 
   0.32 
   0.18 




   0.09 
   0.73 
   0.12 




Somewhat conservative                           
Moderate                         
           
 
   0.13                        0.13                   
   0.23                        0.22 
   0.38                        0.40 
 
 
   0.13 
   0.23 
   0.39 
Somewhat liberal                      
Very liberal  
0.16                        0.16 
   0.09                        0.09 
   0.16 











   0.19            0.19 
   0.22                        0.22 
   0.37                        0.37 




   0.19 
   0.22 
   0.37 
   0.22 






































           Note: Balance tests indicate no significant pre-test differences between the treatment and control 
conditions on any of the key mediator or outcome variables (ps> 0.27). The largest standardized difference is 
0.045 (worry). The 95% (overlapping) confidence intervals are provided in parentheses. N = 6,301 (n = 3,151 
control). 
 




    Pre-test 
   
  
 Pre-test  
  
  Sample      
     Control Treatment   Overall 
    
Perceived scientific consensus      67.02     67.62     67.32 
  (66.24, 67.80) (66.84, 68.39) (66.77, 67.87) 
 
Belief in climate change        5.21 
  (5.15, 5.28) 
    5.29 
(5.23, 5.35) 
    5.25 
(5.21, 5.30) 
    
Belief in human causation       4.95      4.97      4.96 
   (4.89, 5.00)                 (4.92, 5.03) 
 
(4.92, 5.00) 
Worry about climate change        4.66 
  (4.60, 4.73) 
    4.74 
(4.68, 4.81) 
    4.70 
(4.66, 4.75) 
 
Support for public action        5.44 
  (5.39, 5.50) 
    5.48 
(5.43, 5.53) 
   5.46 
(5.42, 5.50) 















  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. ∆ Perceived Scientific Consensus -     
2. ∆ Belief in Climate Change 0.13***  -    
3. ∆ Belief in Human Causation 0.23***  0.17***  -   
4. ∆ Worry about Climate Change 0.13***  0.11***  0.14***  -  
5. ∆ Support for Public Action 0.10***  0.06***  0.09***  0.22***  - 
 
Note: Difference scores were computed by subtracting the pre-test from the post-treatment score for each of t e 






















































































































































































• Using a large national sample, this study replicates the Gateway Belief Model (GBM) 
• Exposure to a consensus message increased perceived scientific consensus (PSC) 
• A change in PSC subsequently predicted (smaller) changes in private attitudes 
• Changes in these attitudes were in turn associated with greater support for action 
• Main effects on PSC were greater for conservatives and reduced motivated cognition 
 
 
